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Political Participation Among Prisoners
DONALD

E.

WHISTLER

University of Central Arkansas
Introduction
Penal systems are among our most serious problem s. 1 Recent riots and
rhetoric have captured our attention, but have not incr ease d our knowledge of
the political attitudes and activities of prisoners. 2 This research : (1) conceptualizes and measures political participation among men in prison ; (2) observes the association of selected sets of social, political , and penal variables
with the inmates' political participation ; (3) compares the inmates ' political
participation to that of the general public ; and , (4) compares minimum and
maximum security samples .
There are two independent samples of prisoners. One consists of 77
volunteers from the 300-man "model" Illinois state minimum security institu tion at Vienna 3 , sampled in March 1972 with much cooperation from administrators and residents. The other contains 112 men from the 1100 who were in
the Arkansas maximum security unit at Cummins. The questionnaire 4 was
administered to them in April 1972. 5 The samples are not random of all
American prisons, but do tap institutional characteristics commonly found and
are of different security arrangements.
Conceptualization of the Study : Dependent Variabl es
Political participation among prisoners (dependent variable ) is conceptualized in two ways. First , activities concerned with formal elections held
among prisoners to determine representatives in Inmate Councils are ob served. These are : interest expressed, voting, campaign activities, and running for or holding an inmate office. Questions 1-6 in Appendix I are measures. This is called formal inmate participation, and corresponds to conventional ways that political participation has been conceptualized in research
involving the general American population. 6 The second way concerns com1lt is difficult to report the magnitude of the rroblem because of unreported and/or
inaccurately reported stati stics. However , on a "typical day federal pri sons contain some 20,000
prisoners, state 200,000 and local about 160,000.
2 For a sampling see : New York Times Index, 1971, pp. 1385-89.
:¥fheVienna Obseroer, October 8, 1971, p. 1.
"The instrument was pretested at the Work Release Center in Carbondale, Illinois in wint er
1971-72. The residents screened terms or phraseology , and for items that had a different meaning
to prisoners or would not be answered honestly .
5The Cummins unit was/is in the process of court-ordered reform (Holt v Sarver , 300 F.
Supp . 825) following disclosure of brutality {see Thomas Murton and Joe Hyams , Accomplices to
the Crime, (New York: Grove Press, 1969). The Cummins sample repres ents an effort by the new
Department of Corrections and the Cummins Administration to demonstrate their commitment
to an open and progressive institution . The Cummins men wer e selected by the Associate
Superintendent of Treatment , Ronald Dobbs , using the criteria of literacy, respect among
inmates, and inclusion of those recently elected ot the new Inmate Council.
8 See : Lester Milbrath, Political Participation , (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1965), p .
18; Donald Matthews and James Prothro , Negroes and the New Southern Politics, {New York:
Harcourt , Brace, and World , Inc ., 1966), p. 53.
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petiti on and/or coop e ration for thin gs valued amon g prison e rs .7 Thi s is named
inform al inm ate pruticip ation , and is ope ration alized by th e extent to which an
inm ate's advice or opinion s are sou ght afte r or listened to reg ardin g thing s of
value to pri son ers (see qu estion s 7-12 App endix I).

Distributi on of Inmat e Political Ac tivities
Th e data rega rdin g form al (Table 1) and inform al (Tabl e 2) prison e r politi cs
sugges ts th at men in minimum (Vienn a) and maximum (Cummins ) security
institution s en gage in inm ate politi cs to about th e sam e extent ; diffe renc es
occur in form al activiti es only with regard to inmat e votin g (significantly
highe r at ,;;; .05 in th e minimum security group ), and informall y th ere is a
slightl y hi gh e r, thou gh non -significant , rat e of particip ant s within th e
maximum sec urity group . Whil e th e re is littl e difference betwee n th e pri soner sampl es, each inm ate group see ms to particip ate in its formal politi cs
mor e than th e American public do es in its compar able politic s. 8 Thi s mee ts
expectation s beca use th e closed natur e of penal institution s causes mo st
eve nt s out of th e pri son routin e to rece ive wid espr ead pri sone r att ention .9
Finall y, Tabl es l and 2 d emon strat e th at th e re is enou gh varianc e in both
typ es of inmat e politics to inquir e int o th eir po ssible association s with select ed
variables in th e re maind er of thi s p ap e r.

TABLE I
DISTRIBUTION OF FORMAL • INMATE
PARTICIPATION IN PERCENTAGES

In te rest
in 111,n
ate

Elections

Voting
in Inm ate
Elections

Campai gn
Ac tioities
in Inm ate
Elections

Leve l of Part icip ation
V
C
V
C
V
C
High
28.6%
29.7%
64.9%
37.8%
4 1.6%
33. 9%
Medium
53. 2%
35. l %
4. 1%
23. 4%
27.3%
25.0%
Low
18.2%
35.1%
31. 1%
37. 7%
31.2%
41.1 %
"See Appe ndix I, qu es tion s 1-6 for ope rationalization of thj s table
Lege nd : V = Vienn a; C = C ummin s; 's equal 77 and 112

Runn ing f or
or Holdin g
an ln11wte
Offi ce
V
9.1 %
20.8%
70.1%

C

10.7 %
24.1%
65.2%

7
Gres ham M . Sykes, The Society of Capti ves, (Prin ce ton , N.J. : Prin ceton Univ e rsity Pr ess ,
1958), pp . 63-83.
8 For th e conventi onal Ame rican rates see: Sidn ey Ve rb a and Norm an Nie, Participati on in
A merica, (New York: Harp er and Row, 1972), p . 3 1.
9'fhj s process is sometimes called "ge arin g-down ." Beca use pri son life usually beco mes
extre me ly routin e and pe tty, and beca use co mmuni cation with oth e r human s is res tri cted to a
small numb er, any eve nt out of th e ordin ary rece ives wides pr ead att ention amon g pri soners. For
a discussion of th e close d natur e of pri sons, see: E rvin g Goffman, "On the Chara cte ristics ofT otal
In stituti ons: Th e Inm ate World ," in Donald R. C ressey , Th e Prison, (New York : Holt , Rinehart ,
and Win ston, 1961), p . 16.
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TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMAL INMATE PARTICIPATION "
Mi n im um Secu rity
M axim um Sec u,;ty
LevPI of
( Vien11a)
Infonna l A ctivity
(Cumm ins)
2%(2)
High
0%(0)
Moderate ly Hi gh
10%(8)
16%(18)
46
%(35)
Medium
50%(56)
34%(26)
Modera te ly Low
24%(27)
Low
10%(8)
9%(11)
"See Appe nd ix 1, ques tions 7- 12 for opera tionalization of tab le

Ind ependent Variables and Find ings
Four se ts of ind epend e nt va riables are examin ed for th e ir re lationship s
with th e two types of inmat e politi cs. Th ese are: (1) pr e-p enal socio-eco nomi c
characteri stics; (2) politi ca l attitud es; (3) pr e-pe nal politi cal expe riences; and
(4) penal vari abl es . All coefficient s report ed ar e Kend all Tau B's at .;;; .05 leve l
of significance. 10
Th e first se t of pr e-pe nal sociological va riabl es is di vided int o two sub se ts.
Th e first sub se t cont ain s e le ment s th at indi cate ea rly expo sur e to crimin al
expe riences : size of plac e rear ed , brok e n hom e , and str ee t gang involv e me nt .
Resea rch has sugges ted th at th ese are link ed with crimin alit y and influ e nce
amon g pri soners. 11 Howe ve r, thi s resea rch find s th at none is related significantl y to pri son e r politi cs in e ith e r sampl e of pri sone rs, alth ough th e re is a
wea k (Ke ndall' s T au B = 0 . 20) in clin ati on for m e n from large r urb an
back ground s to be mor e involv ed in th e inform al activiti es of th e minimum
securit y sampl e. With rega rd to th e di stribution s of thi s sub se t, some 60 and
54 pe rce nt of th e minimum and maximum sec urit y sampl es res pect ive ly
report th ey ar e from places ove r 15,000 ;12 and som e 31 pe rce nt of both group s
report th at th eir p arent s are di vorce d or we re ne ve r marri ed ; simil arily 3 1
pe rcent of both group s say th ey were str ee t gan g memb e rs before in carce ration .
Th e second sociological sub se t cont ains pr e-p enal var iables whi ch lite ratur e indi cates could be important tow ard parti cipation : occ up ational statu s,
education , social mobility , race, and age. In ge ne ral, th e re is a mild inclin ation
for each vari e ty of inm ate politi cs to increase in both th e minimum and
maximum securit y sampl es as th ese variabl es increase.
1°Ke nd all's Tau Bi s a measu re of association be twee n two ordi nal ly meas ured variab les. For
details see: Hub e rt M. Blalock, Soc ial Statisti cs, ( ew Yor k: McGraw -Hill Book Co. , 1960), pp.

3 19-25.
11 Marshall B. C linard , (Sociolog y of De l)iant Be hav io r,
ew Yor k: Holt, Rine hart , and
Win ston, Inc. , 1966), pp. 104, 3 17- 18, 225.
12Onl y size of place may be comp ared to th e p ublic, and Verba and
ie re port th at th e fee ling
of comm on ide ntit y rath er th an size is the imp ortant variable for the pu blic. See Verb a and ie,
Pa rticipati on in A me rica , pp . 236-37.
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TABLE 3
"On the outsid e, what was th e best legal job you had ?"
Joh
Minimum Security
Statu s
(Vienna)
High (e .g., Teacher
0%(0)
or Lawyer )
26%(19)
Medium (e. ~., Plumb e r
or Me chanic )
74%(54)
Low (e .g. , Hired
Hand or Labor er)

Maximum Security
(Cummins )
8%(9)
34%(37)
58%(63)

Looking at this second subset of sociological variables in more detail, Table
3 illustrates that the pre-penal occupational status of the prisoners is the usual
preponderence of lower SES found in state prisons. 13 Regarding relationships , the prisoners in both groups are mildly inclined to increase their
participation in both types of prisoner politics significantly (,s;;;.05) as their
pre-penal job status increases (Formal: Vienna campaign 0.25, office 0.27;
Cummins: office 0.20. Informal: Vienna 0.29; Cummins 0.24). 14
Looking at education , both sets of prisoners grouped in the junior and
senior high school categories (about 75 percent). The maximum security
(Cummins ) men show no relationships, while the minimum group does
slightly increase its involvement in prisoner politics with higher education
(Formal: interest 0. 16, campaign 0.12, office 0.22; Informal: 0.20). Thus,
while various studies have shown an increase in the public 's conventional
political participation accompanying increases in job status and education, this
is the consistent pattern only for the minimum security sample , the maximum
group has this pattern for job status and inmate politics but not for education
and inmate politics.
Pre-penal social mobility was measured by comparing the best legal job of
the prisoner with that of his father; so little existed no relationships could be
ascertained. 15
Black Americans comprise about 11 percent of the population, yet state
prisons routinely contain 30 to 60 percent black men. 16 This disproportionate
black share of the penal population was expected to be important because
prisons are thought to reflect various societal conditions, including racial
13 Richard Korn and Lloyd McCorkle , Criminology and Penology , (New York: Holt ,
Rinehart , and Winston , 1959), p. 319.
14
Enclosed in parentheses are the statistically significant (,s;;.05) Kendall Tau B correlation
coefficients specifying the relationships just discussed. Intrepreting this for the reader: The
Vienna sample displays a statistically significant coefficient of0 .25 between pre-penal job status
and inmate campaign activities and one of0.27 between inmate office activities and pre-penal job
status , while among the Cummins respondents a significant coefficient of 0.20 exists between
pre-penal job status and inmate office activities . And the Vienna group 's informal participation
increased as pre-penal job status increased to the extent of a 0.29 Tau B coe ficient, with tbe
Cummins men increasing at a 0.24 coefficient .
15 This lack of social mobility is of note to social theorists who link crime to lack of legitimate
opportunities for low classes to achieve material and status rewards . See: Marshall Clinard,
Sociology of Deviant Behavior , pp. 317-18.
16 Korn and McCorkle, Criminology and Penology, p. 319.
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. 17The minimum security institution (Vienna) normally contained 40
black, while its sample has 38; these percentages for the maximum
sample are 48 and 31 respectively.

TABLE 4
AVERAGES • OF I MATE PARTICIPATION-BY RACE AND SECURITY
Fonnal Inmat e
Minimum Security
Maximum Security
Participation
Black
Whit e
Black
Whit e
Running for or
Holding an Inmate
1.66
1.66
1.65
l.82
Office
(29)<
(4 7)
(34)
(76)
Campaign Activities
2.50
2.26
2.40
2.03
in Inmate Elections
(29)
(47)
(34)
(76)
Voting in
3.93
3.61
3.63
2.86
Inmat e Elections
(29)
(42)
(34)
(76)
Inter est in
2.48
2.34
2.38
2. 18
Inmate Elections
(29)
(47)
(34)
(76)
Informal Inmat e
3.06b
2.82
2.81
3.28
Participation
(29)
(47)
(34)
(76)

"The scale ranged from 5 to 1 for each of the formal activiti es (i.e. , High = 5, Medium = 3, Low = l
corresponding to the rows in Tabl e 1).
~he scale is also 5 to 1 for informal activities .
"The numbers in parentheses are the number of respondents in that cell.

In each sample black prisoners participate slightly more in formal inmate
politics, except holding inmate office among the maximum security group.
The results for informal activities are mixed: blacks higher among the
minimum security men but lower within the maximum set. However, in all
instances these differences are small and none is statistically significant.
Compared to the American public, the inmates in general seem to exhibit the
hierarchical pattern reported for the general public. 18At the same time, black
prisoners with their slightly higher formal activity rate, appear to differ from
the reports of black conventional political participation in the general public.19
The ages of the men surveyed averaged 26 and 29 for the minimum and
maximum samples respectively . As expected, 20 our samples display a mild
tendency for both types of inmate politics to increase as their ages increase
(Forma l: Vienna voting 0.20 , office 0.20 ; Cummins voting 0.17, office 0. 19;
Informal: Vienna 0.27 ; Cummins 0.32). These relationships are similar to
those reported for the American public concerning age and political participa17Autobiography of Malcolm X , (New York: Grove Press , Inc. , 1966); Georg e Jackson ,
Soledad Broth er, ( ew York: Bantam Books, 1970); Etheridge Kn;ght , Black Voices From Prison ,
( ew York: Pathfinder Press. 1970).
18 Milbrath , Political Participation , p . 18. Only interest in inmate elections did not scale
hierarcrucally .
19 Matthews and Prothro have reported that in the Deep South blacks participated less in
"visible" actions , e.g ., campaigns , but more in "invisible " actions , e .g., discussing politics among
themselves. See their Negroes and the ew Southern Politics , pp. 44-45. And Verba and Nie have
written that blacks were under represented in contactinp; public officials either for personal or
communal concerns , and in being inactive ; but that blacks we re over represented in being
inactives , voting only , and in partisan camprugns . See their Partici.pation in Am erica, p. 152.
2
°Clarenc e Schrag , " Leadership Among Prison Inmates ," Am erican Sociological Review ,
Vol. XIX (Feb ., 1954), p. 34.
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tion , 21 and support s the noti on th at inm ate p articipation increase with expe rie nce as it app arentl y does in th e ge nera l publi c. 22
TABLE 5
..Whe n you were on th e stree ts, abo ut how often did you d iscuss political th ings?"
Mi nimum Security
Maximum Secu rity
(Vienn a) (N =77)
(C ummin s) (N =112)
A Great Deal
10.4%(8)
7. 1%(8)
Oft n
14.3%(11)
5.4 %(6)
Occasionally
4 . 1%(37)
50.9%(57)
Almost ever
27.3%(21)
36.6%(41)
..Whe n yo u we re e ligible to vote on the out side, how olien did you vote in various local, state, and
national e lections?"
)ways
21.l %(12)
16.5%(17)
sually
17.5%(10)
7.8%(8)
Occasionally
17.5%(10)
20.4%(21)
eve r
43.9 %(25)
55.3%(57)
"On the out side, did you every go to a political rally or mee tin g of any kind?"
Often
11.7%(9)
9. %(11)
Occasionally
24. 7%( 19)
24. l %(27)
On ce or Twice
29.9%(23)
20.5%(23)
eve r
33.8%(26)
45.5%(51)
"On th e out side , did you eve r hold an e lective office of any kind ?"
Yes
22. 7%(17)
20. %(22)
77.3%(5 )

o

79.2%(83)

Turning our atte ntion now toward th e second se t of inm ate' s pr e-pe nal
conv e ntional political expe riences, four activiti e are observ d : discussion of
politic s, votin g, att endan ce at rallies, and e lectiv e offices h Id. Th e di stribu tion s in Tabl 5 mee t expect ation s in be ing lowe r than that of the public 's in
discus sion of politi cs and votin g. How eve r, th e pri son e r's att ndance at rallies
and th e holdin g of e lec tive office are high e r. 23 Regardin g relation ship s, ge ne rally ·th e re is som mild to mod e rate carryov e r of pr e-penal political experie nces into formal inmat e politic s, but only incon sistentl y into informal pri sone r activiti es. Mor e specifically, as th e leve l of pr e-penal politi cal di scussion s
incr ea ses both types of inmat e politic s tend to significantl y incr eas in each
sampl e (Formal: Vienna int r st 0.26, votin g 0.26 ; Cummin s inte res t 0.23,
voting 0.23, campaign 0.28 , office 0. 11. Inform al: Vienn a 0.14 ; Cummin s
0.21 ). With respec t to pr e-pe nal voting , th e r is a mod erat e tend ency for
formal inmat e activiti e s to incr eas in both sampl es with higher pr e-penal
voting levels, but no re lation ships re gardin g informal (Formal: Vienn a voting
0.25, office 0.25; Cummins int e rest 0.23 , votin g 0. 16, campaign 0.17 , office
0.17). Formal inmate activiti es in both groups incr eases mod erat e ly as pre21 Milbr ath ,

Politi cal Parti cipati o11, p . 134.
and ie, Parti cipati on in A me rica , p. 14 .
31 perce nt of the publi c report ed as express ing a politi cal opini on see ms hig_
h e r th an

22 Ve rba
2 3The

th e inm ates, thou gh a differe nt qu estion was used , see : John Robin son, Je rrold Rusk, and Ke ndr a
Head , Measur es of Politi cal A ttitud es, (Ann Arbor , Mich.: Institut e for Social Resea rch, Jul y,
1969), pp . 591, 602. Th e on e-third of pri sone rs who say th ey usually or always voted is b low th e
publi c, see: / bid ., p . 591. Whil e att e ndance at rallies was low, it was highe r th an that report ed for
th e publi c, see: / bid ., p. 604. o doubt , th e pri soner·s elective office figure was inflated by th e m
countin g any office .
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penal attend anc e at rallies incr eases , but thi s patt ern is found only amon g th e
maximum me n for informal action s (Form al: Vie nna int erest 0. 17, votin g 0 .20;
Cummin s inte rest 0.28 , votin g 0.23, camp aign 0 .17, office 0. 13. Inform al:
Cummin s 0. 17). No relation ship exists be twee n pr e-penal electiv e offices h eld
and inm ate politi cs. 24
Th e third set of variabl es are politi cal attitud es . Beca use mu ch of th e
rhetori c of rece nt pri son upri sings has ove rton es of politic al alie nation, two
attitudinal aspects are examin ed : (1) Th e fee ling of tru st, confid ence , or
affec tion th at inmat es dir ec t toward th e " nation " (diffu se support ). 2 5
Rese arche rs have found thi s to be one dim e nsion of politi cal alienation .26 (2)
Th e exte nt to which pri soners fee l th ey can influ ence th eir politi cal e nvironment . Thi s is ob served by inquirin g into th e ir feeling of politi cal futilit y. Table
6 displa ys that th e maximum security group ha s a significantl y higher fee ling of
confid ence in th e national gove rnm ent th an th e minimum set. How eve r, both
inm ate group s are lowe r th an the 90 p e rcent of th e publi c who agree d or
agree d stron gly with a similar stateme nt 27 (combinin g th e Stron gly Agree and
Agree pe rce nt ages for th e first qu estion in Table 6: minimum security pe rce nt
45; maximum securit y p e rce nt 69). With respec t to relation ship s, only the
maximum sec urity men mildl y incr ease some formal activiti es as th etr diffu se
support incr eases (int eres t 0.24, votin g 0.20, campai gn 0 .29).
TABLE 6
"I usually have connd e nce that th e gove rnm e nt will do what is right. ··•
Minimu m Security
Maximum Security
(Vienn a)
(C ummin s)
Strongly Agree
7.8%(6)
13.4 %(15)
Agree
37. 7%(29)
55.4%162)
Di sagree
45.5 %(35)
27. 7% 31)
Str ongly Di sagree
9. 1%(7)
3. 1% 4)
"E ve n if I could vote , it's no u se wo rrying m y hea d about publi c affairs on th e ou tside, I couldn 't
do anythin g about th em anyway."b
Str ongly Agree
5.2 %(4)
8. 0%(9)
Agree
22. l %(11)
24. l %(21)
Di sagree
48. l %(31)
49. 1%(55)
Stron gly Di sagree
24.7%(19)
18.8%(21)
"Meas ur e of diffuse supp ort
bM eas ure of politi cal futilit y

Th e prison e rs displa y high e r political futility than th e 20 percent of th e
public who agreed or agr ee d stron gly with a similar state ment 28 (combinin g
24Thi s last state me nt is re nd e red less re liable by th e small 's (Vie nn a 17; Cummin s 22)
resu ltin g from 20 pe rce nt of eac h sampl e having report ed holdin g any elec tive office befo re
incarce ration , e .g., schoo l and organi zation offices.
25David Easton , A Sy stems A nalysis of Political Life, (New York: John Wil ey and Sons, In c.,
1965), p . 273.
26John Jackson III , "Th e Political Behavior and Socio-Eco nomic Background s of Black
Stud ent s: Th e Ant ece d ent s of Pr otest", Mid west Journ al of Political Science, Vol. XV , ( ov.,
1971), pp . 661-686.
27Th e qu es t. ion used with th e publi c was: "I usually have confide nce th at th e gove rnm ent will
do wh at is right ." Robin son, Rusk, and Head , Measures of Political At titu des, p . 177.
28The item used with th e publi c was: "It' s no use worry ing my head about public affair s, l
can't do an ythin g about th e m anyway." Robin son, Rusk, and H ead , Measu res of Political
Attitu des , p. 178.

74

JO URNAL OF' POLITI CAL SCIE

CE

th e Strongl y Agree and Agree per ent age for th seco nd question in Table 6
yie lds : minimum 27 pe rcent ; maximum 32). Ob s rving th e re lation ship s, eac h
sample has a mild but con istent te nd ency to d ec rease both forms of in mat
politics as the ir rat of politic al futilit incr eases (Form al: Vi nna int er st
- 0.21 , voting - 0.26, campaign - 0.11; Cummins inter es t - 0.36, voting
- 0.3 1, campaign - 0.28 , office - 0.16. Informal : Vienn a - 0.23 ; Cummins
- 0.15). This pattern is similar to that of th public . 29
Th e final se t of variables are penal in natur e and are divid ed into thr ee
subsets. Th e first subset consists of criminality in th e prison e rs' family , reform
school experience, and age at first arr st. Th ese were expect ed to b indications of skills and/or alues that would promote int rp rsonal influe nc among
prisoners ; the y did not. o re lationship was found . Th e di stribution s ar
pr ese nted in the footnot e be low.30
The se ond subset of pen al variables is concerned with criminal attitud s
and m ntal states: adh rence to criminal values, aggressiveness, and penal
rule violation inclin ation. The first part of Tabl e 7 displays the low adherence
to criminal values in both samples. Each sample has mod e rate trend s toward
decreasing participation in each form of inmat politics a adh r nee to
criminal values incr ea es 31 (Formal : Vienna interest - 0.14, voting - 0.22 ;
ummin interest - 0.22, voting - 0.20, campaign - 0.33 , office - 0.14. In formal : Vi nna - 0.23; Cummins - 0.24).
Th e samples also illustrat e a low aggressiveness (second part of Table 7).
More aggressive inmates hav e a mildly higher informal involvem e nt (Vienna
0.14; Cummins 0.19) but no relation ships with formal prisoner politic s. 32
29 Verba

and i , Participati on i,1 America, p.
.
°Cri minality in the family was asce rtain ed by asking,· · How many close relatives do you have
who have done tim e?" Ove r one-half of th e Vienna men and 3 perce nt of t he Cummins group said
that th ey had at leas t on such re lative. ome 23 and 38 percen t of the ienna and Cummins men
respectively repo rt havin g been in a reform school. About two-third s say th ey were arres ted for
th e first tim e by age 18, anoth e r 16 and 17 pe rce nt of Vienna and Cummins me n respectively
repo rt th eir first arrest was between th e ag, s of 19 and 21.
31
Literature would have sugges ted otherwise. ee: Donald Garrity , "the Pri son as a RehabiJ;tation Agency ," in Donald Cressey , ed ., The Priso n, p. 359.
32
Clemmer stron gly impli ed that inmate lead rs were agg ressive, thou gh he did not use the
te rm , Donald Clemmer , The Prison Community , ( ew York: Holt , Rine hart , and Win ston , In c.,
1968), Ch . VI; Syke desc rib d his ··rea l man " role- typ e as dominant and sugges ted he was
aggressive thou gh not in an unthinkin g mann e r, Gresham ykes, Th e Society of Captives,
(Prin ce ton ,
Prin ce ton University Pr ess, 1958), pp . 101-102; McCl eery has sugges ted that
since ind epe n e nce is a crucial value amon g pri sone rs, in0u ential inm ates are at leas t agg ress ive
e nough to avoid being aggressed against , Richard McCl eery, "The Governmental Process and
Informal Social Control" , in Donald R. Cressey , ed ., The Prison, p. 166; ch rag reported a stron g
te nde ncy for influential inmates to be aggress ive, larence chrag , '"Leaders hip Among Pri son
Inmat es," p. 40.
3
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TABLE 7
''People who work for a living are fools," and " Because of the way a man is treated in prison , he
sho uld take the first chance he has to get even with society." •
Minimum Security
Maximum Security
(Vienna )
(Cummins )
Strongly Agree
1.3 %(1)
6.3 %(7)
Agree
6.5%(5}
5.4 %(6)
Disagree
29. 9%(23)
33. 9%(38)
Strongly Disagree
62.4 %(48)
54. l %(61)
"Jfl want somet hin g, I don't let anythin g stand in my way as long as I know I can ge t by with it." b
Always True
0%
7.1 %(8)
Usua lly True
11. 7%(9)
8. 9%(10)
Sometimes True
41.6 %(32)
42.0 %(47)
ever True
46.8%(36)
42.0 %(47)
" I get more tickets (write-ups ) than most guys here do ."c
Strongly Agree
1.3%(1)
1.8%(2)
Agree
0%
ll.8 %(13l
Disagre e
39.5 %(30)
62. 7%(69
Strongly Disagree
59.2%(45)
23.6 %(26)
"The responses to these two questions were comb ined to measure ad here nce to crimina l values.
"Measure of aggressiveness.
' Measure of penal rule violation rate .

Th e maximum sec urity men are significantl y mor e inclin ed to br eak penal
rul es (last part of Table 7). How ever , with resp ect to relationships, the
maximum men only slightl y increase one formal inmat e activity (office 0.13) as
th e ir violations incr ease. And, while th e minimum men show no effec t on
formal activiti es th ey dec rease th eir inform al involv ement a littl e with high e r
violations ( -).
Th e final sub set of penal variables are: length of sent ence, tim e serve d, and
recidivi sm. In ge nera l, th e formal inmate activities incr ease only among th e
minimum men with incr eases in thi s subset, wh ereas informal involvem ent
incr eases in both sample s as thi s subset incr eases. Specifically , as th e length of
sentence incr eases th e minimum me n incr ease their formal and informal
rates, while th e maximum group does so only informally (Formal: Vie nn a
int eres t 0.23 , voting 0.21 , campaign 0.16, office 0.27. Informal : Vienna 0.25;
Cummins 0 .21). Tim e se rved in pri son has a small incr ease in both samples for
eac h form of inmate politics (Formal : Vienna int e res t 0.24, voting 0.27 ,
campai gn 0.24, office 0.24 ; Cummins office 0.20. Informal : Vie nna 0 .25;
Cummins 0.24). Fin ally, rec idivism show s only one relation ship with formal
inm ate politic s (Vie nna voting 0.19 ) and informal actions incr ease only among
maximum men (0.20). Th e distribution s are in the footnote below. 33

Summary and Conclusions
This resea rch has conceptualized political participation among prison e rs in
two ways: First , in te rms of th eir involv e ment in activities concerned with
elec tion among prison e rs to inmat e offices; seco nd , in te rms of an informal
inmat e "peckin g order", ascertained by whose advice is sought among prison33 Le ngt h of sente nces varied , but 30 and 37 percent of the Vienna and Cumm ins sa~p les are
over 10 years. Also, time served v>triedbu t was conce nt rated in the 2-to-10 range . Rec1d1v1
sm was
41 and 70 percent respectively for Vienna and Cummi ns.

76

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL

SCIE

CE

ers. These formal and informal inmate political activities are similarly patterned in both maximum and minimum penal security samples of volunteers , 34 and the prisoners ' participation rates in formal inmate politics are
higher than the general public 's participation in conventional politics. To the
extent that they are comparable, selected variables associated with the general public's participation in conventional politics tend also to be mildly
related to prisoner politics in the same direction as the public 's especially in
the minimum security sample. Finally , formal and informal inmate influentials tend to have similar characteristics except that informal leaders are
somewhat more aggressive and incljned to adhere to criminal values.
Inmate influentials , like leaders in general, reflect a given group's dominate values and are able to articulate its demands with some success. 35 The
prisoners in our samples illustrate the emergence of men influential in formal
inmate politics who are not oriented toward criminal values , are not more
aggressive, and are not prison rule violators. This is indicative of the penal
institutions ' reflection of the society in general , with its greater sophistication
and societal/prison communications. However, informal influentials continue
to be characterized by more aggressiveness and adherence to criminal values ,
with those in the maximum security sample also inclined to be penal institution rule violators (though the minimum security informal influentials are
lower rule violators ). Formal and informal influentials differ on these characteristics because the men represent different "constituencies" , i.e ., formal
leaders must be capable of articulating prisoners ' dominant values and aims to
penal authorities, thus they represent the more general prisoner population ;
whereas, since informal leaders do not have to deal with those outside the
society of prisoners, they may be men of prominence in a specific clique of four
or five like-minded prisoners but where the cliques may differ from one
another in values and aims (cliques usually center around similarities in age ,
backgrounds, common criminal experiences , etc. ).
Having an early exposure to criminal elements does not provide an advantage in acquiring information and skills of influence among prisoners. Various
indications of such experiences - size of place born and raised, broken home
experiences, membership and/or position in a pre-penal street gang, criminality in the family, reform school background , and age at first arrest- are of no
importance in inmate politics. It is experience in prison that provides the
opportunity to acquire the knowledge , values and skills necessary for influence among prisoners : In both samples there is a tendency for men older than
the institution's average (but not old), those with longer sentences , greater
time served, and recidivists to be more active in both types of inmate politics
(except for recidivism and informal involvement among the minimum security
respondents ).
34 The

volunteers included those elected to inmate office in both samples.
35 A discussion of leadership theory is contained in : Ralph M. Stogdill , Handbook of Lead e rship : A Surv ey of Leader ship, (New York: The Free Press , 1974), ch. l.
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Do politi cally alie nat ed , fatalistic men have a di sproportion ate influ ence
among pri sone rs as some rece nt riot s have sugges ted ?36 Since our samples are
not of rioters , thi s question cannot be dir ec tly answered. How eve r, in the
samples prisoners are mor e politicall y alienated than the general public , but
politically alienated inmate s are not more influential in inmate politics.
Moreover , those inmates more fatalistic concerning their influenc e over
public affairs are less active in pri sone r politic s.
Black men particip ate somewhat mor e in each sample for both types of
inmate politics . How eve r, in light of the att ention th at race has rece ntl y
received, one would hav e expec ted a stron ge r relation ship. Th e author
sugges ts the reason race is not so import ant is beca use black men do not
comprise a majority of eith er penal population surveyed. Th e data he rein do
not allow dir ec t analysis of th e impact of pe rcentage black (since th e re are only
two samples). How ever, indir ect ev ide nce from other sources is supportive:
In penal institution al arrangements ranging from th e Pontia c, Illinoi s in stitution for young offenders to the California maximum security prison at San
Qu e ntin , race app ea rs vital when black pri sone rs compris e greater th an half of
th ese population s. At Pontia c you ng black str ee t gang me mb e rs are report ed
by former resi dents 37 as overwhelmingly dominant , while at San Qu entin th e
former warden claims th at racial-based gan gs (Aryan Broth e rhood , Black
Guerrilla Army, Nuestra Famil y, Mexican Mafia) are promin ent and make
control difficult with violence inev itabl e. 38
Involv e ment in "lowe r" leve ls of pr e-pe nal conventional political activities
(i.e ., politival discussions and voting) is an asset with re spect to formal inmat e
politic s, (thou gh not for informal ); how eve r, having enga ge d in "highe r" leve ls
of pr e-pe nal activities (i.e., campaign and office) is not. This seems to be the
case beca use me n who hav e been highly involved in conventional pr e-p enal
politic s are mor e inclin ed to identify with th e establish ed order outside the
prison (or are identifi ed with it by the other prisoners ), and are not trust ed
and/or are not int eres ted in inm ate affairs.
Thu s, pri sone r political activities are conducted in a patt ern similar to the
convention al political activities of th e ge nera l public , although at somew hat
high er rates ; and , whil e selected variables that are associated with th e public 's
conventional political participation are mildly inclined to show similar relation ship s in prison e r politic s, societal and historical conditions are also reflec ted in prisoner politics , as are the probl e ms inh e rent in incarc era tion.
APPENDIX I
Thi s app e ndi x is organized for th e reade r's convenience in int e rpr eting
Tables 1 and 2. Qu estion s 1-6 are th e indic ators of formal inm ate political
36 New

York Times Ind ex, 1971, pp. 1385-89.
This information came from int erviews with former residents at the Pon tiac instituti on who
were in the Work Re lease Ce nter in Carbonda le, Jllinois.
38 "Ex-warden Sees Violence as Unmanageab le in Future ", A,· kan sas Gaze tte, July 6, 1974,
p. 6A.
37
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participation . The designations of HIGH , MEDIUM, and LOW above the
alternative answers correspond to those rows in Table 1. The numbers in
parenthesis beside these designations are the values assigned to them. Ques tions 7-12 are averaged to measure informal inmate involvement. The designations of HIGH to LOW above the alternatives , and the values assigned to
them (in parenthesis ), correspond to the rows in Table 2.
1. How interested would you say you are in things like the Resident's (or
Inmate 's) Council?
(5) HIGH
I OTTEN THINK AND
TALK ABOUT SUCH
THINGS

(3) MEDIUM
O CE IN AWHILE I
THINK AND TALK
ABOUT SUCH THINGS

(1) LOW
I ALMOST NEVER
THINK OR TALK
ABOUT SUCH THI

GS

2. As you know , some penal institutions allow inmates to elect other
inmates to offices such as an Inmat e Council. When you have had the chance
to vote in such inmate elections , how often have you voted?
(5) HIGH
EVERY OR ALMOST
EVERY TIME

(3) MEDIUM
ONCE I AWHILE

(1) LOW
ALMOST EVER
OR EVER

(Qu e stions 3 and 4 averaged to obtain inmate campaign activities .)
3. I try to get guys organized to help e lect the right man to the Resident's
(or Inmate 's) Council?
(5) HIGH
THIS IS DEFINITELY
OR USUALLY TRUE

(3) MEDIUM
THIS IS
SOMETIMES TRUE

(1) LOW
THIS IS
EVER TRUE

4. I try to talk other men into voting for the right man for Resident's (or
Inmate 's) Council.
(alternatives same as question 3)
(Questions 5 and 6 averaged for inmate office activities .)
5. I have been a candidate for an elective inmate (or resident ) office such as
the Resident Council.
(5) HIGH
YES, I HAVE SEVERAL
TIMES

(3) MEDIUM
YES, I HAVE A
COUPLE OF TIMES

(1) LOW
NO , I NEVER HAVE

6. Have you ever held (or now hold ) any office or position where you were
elected by other inmates (or residents )?
(alternatives same as question 5)
(Questions 7 - 12 averaged to obtain informal involvement. )
7. Compared to other residents (inmates ) here , about how much do other
men tak e your advic e about how to settle an argument or a fight among
residents (inmates )?
(5) HIGH
A LOT MORE
THAN THEY
DO FROM
MOST ME

(4) MOD . HIGH
A LITTLE
MORE THA
THEY DO
FROM MOST
MEN

(3) MEDIUM
ABOUT THE
SAME AS
THEY DO
FROM MOST
MEN

(2) MOD . LOW
A LITTLE
LESS THA
THEY DO
FROM MOST
MEN

(1) LOW
A LOT LESS
THAN THEY
DO FROM
MOST MEN
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8. Compared to other residents (inmates ) here, about how often do men
try to find out from you what's going to happen around here? (alternatives
same as question 7)
9. Compared with other residents (inmates ) here , about how much do
other men ask you.r advic e about ways to get "goo d time?" (alternatives same
as question 7)
10. Compared to other residents (inmates ) here , about how often do other
men ask your advice about what the good jobs are here ? (alternativ es same as
question 7)
11. Compared to other residents (inmates ) here , about how much do
other men listen to what you think should be done about some guy who is
doing something that messes things up for other residents? (alternatives same
as question 7)
12. Compared to other residents (inmates ) here , about how often do men
ask your advice about how to get housing unit transfers ? (alternatives same as
question 7)

